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INVOLUNTARY BANKRUPTCY-COOPERATIVE
MARKETING ASSOCIATIONS
In 1931, a federal district court in California1 held that an incorporated marketing cooperative was not amenable to involuntary
bankruptcy proceedings and cited as directly deciding the issue an
earlier decision by a federal district court in Indiana. 2 Although
there has been no subsequent litigation of the question in the Ninth
Circuit, post-1931 decisions in other circuits8 have held marketing
cooperatives subject to involuntary bankruptcy adjudication. This
note will analyze the present law as it pertains to the amenability of
these associations to involuntary bankruptcy.

Who May Be Adjudged Bankrupt?
In initially determining who is susceptible to bankruptcy, the
Bankruptcy Act 4 distinguishes between alleged bankrupts who initiate their own proceedings and those who are forced into bankruptcy proceedings by the petitions of their creditors. With respect
to the former, subsection 4(a) 5 of the Act provides:
Any person, except a municipal, railroad, insurance, or banking corporation or a building and loan association, shall be entitled to the
benefits of this title as a voluntary bankrupt.
Since "person," as defined by the Bankruptcy Act, extends to corporations as well as natural persons, 6 and since marketing associations are not otherwise specifically excluded from this subsection, it
is clear that they are not prohibited from petitioning for voluntary
bankruptcy. 7
Liability to involuntary proceedings in bankruptcy is not so summarily determined. Subsection 4(b) of the Bankruptcy Act states:
Any natural person, except a wage earner or farmer, and any moneyed, business, or commercial corporation, except a building and loan
association, a municipal, railroad, insurance, or banking corporation
* . . may be adjudged an involuntary bankrupt .... 8
By definition marketing cooperatives are not within either the "natural person" category or within any of the specified exceptions to the
"moneyed, business, or commercial corporation" category. Their position relative to involuntary bankruptcy consequently turns on whether
In re Weeks Poultry Community, Inc., 51 F.2d 122 (S.D. Cal.).
In re Dairy Marketing Ass'n, 8 F.2d 626 (D. Ind. 1925), noted in 74
U. PA. L. REV. 408 (1926).
8 Missco Homestead Ass'n v. United States, 185 F.2d 280 (8th Cir. 1950);
First Wisconsin Nat'l Bank v. Wisconsin Co-operative Milk Pool, 119 F.2d 999
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 655 (1941); Schuster v. Ohio Farmers' Cooperative Milk Ass'n, 61 F.2d 337 (6th Cir. 1932); In re South Shore Cooperative Ass'n, 4 F. Supp. 772 (W.D.N.Y. 1933).
4 Ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544 (1898), as amended, 11 U.S.C. (1964).
5 11 U.S.C. § 22(a) (1964).
1
2

11 U.S.C. § 1(23) (1964).
7 F. EvANs & E. SToxDyxs,
THE LAW OF CO-OPRArIE MARmXnaG 229-30
6

(1937).
8 11 U.S.C. § 22(b) (1964).
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or not they can be classified as "moneyed, business, or commercial
corporation [s]." Inasmuch as this phrase is not defined by the Bankruptcy Act, the amenability of these associations to involuntary bankruptcy is directly dependent upon judicial interpretation.
Moneyed, Business, or Commercial Corporation
In re Dairy Marketing Association,9 the primary authority 10 exempting marketing cooperative associations from involuntary bankruptcy proceedings, interpreted the phrase "moneyed, business, or
commercial corporation" to include "such corporations as were engaged in enterprises for profit, and did not intend to include ...
nonprofit cooperative marketing associations, none of which are conducted for profit to themselves or to their members as such."" The
holding has two aspects: the first involves the adoption of the enterprise for profit test for determining a "moneyed, business, or commercial corporation," and the second involves the question of what
factors are to be considered in the test's application.
Before examining these aspects, the anomalous financial character of a cooperative will be briefly considered, because the uncertainty of cooperatives being "moneyed, business, or commercial corporation [s]" stems from this characteristic.
Nonprofit Character of a Cooperative
A cooperative is an organization that is owned by its members
and controlled by them on a substantially equal basis. It furnishes
to its members economic services, such as the marketing of their
products, without entrepreneur or capital profit to itself. 12 Of importance to this discussion is the cooperative's nonprofit character.
Whereas in the normal business corporation the excess of receipts
over expenditures is subject to the control of management after it
has accrued, and hence is clearly profit to the corporation, this excess
in a cooperative by contract vests in its patrons 13 pro rata to the
quantity of products marketed for each. 14 The cooperative is required to account to its members for the full net amount it receives
for commodities delivered by the members to the cooperative.' 5 This
nonprofit characteristic is formally recognized in many states 6 by
provisions in their marketing acts which provide substantially as follows:
9 8 F.2d 626 (D. Ind. 1925).
10 In re Weeks Poultry Community, Inc., 51 F.2d 122, 123, the other case

holding similarly, said that In re Dairy Marketing Ass'n "clearly decides the
question."
11 8 F.2d at 628 (emphasis added).
12

TivEs 3

1.PAcKEL,

THE LAw OF THE ORGANIZATION AND OPERATION OF COOPERA-

(2d ed. 1947).

13 "The members of a cooperative ordinarily stand in a three-fold relation to the cooperative: as members; as patrons; and as investors." Misculer,
Agricultural Cooperative Law, 30 RocKY MT.L. REv. 381, 383 (1958).
14 L. HULBERT, LEGAL PHASES OF FARMER COOPERATIVEs 1 (Farmer Coop-

erative Serv. Bull. No. 10, 1958).
15 Id. at 131.
16 Id. at 129.
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Associations organized hereunder shall be deemed "nonprofit", inasmuch as they are not organized to make profit for themselves, as
such, or for
1 their members, as such, but only for their members as
producers. 7
"Enterprise for Profit" Test
The first aspect of the In re Dairy Marketing Association holding involves the construction given to the phrase "moneyed, business,
or commercial corporation." The district court interpreted the phrase
to include such organizations as were engaged in enterprises for
profit.1 8 This construction was in line with the interpretation given
to the phrase by other courts in unrelated cases.19 The phrase
"moneyed, business, or commercial corporation," which was first used
in the Bankruptcy Act of 1867,20 omitted in the Act of 1898,21 and
returned by amendment thereto in 1910,22 was generally held in
the early decisions to include corporations organized for the "sake of
gain" 23 or "pecuniary profit" 24 and to exclude charitable, religious
or educational corporations. 25 By applying this "profit" criterion to
cooperatives, the court 26 placed them with the latter corporations.
State Classification Theory
The second aspect of the court's decision concerns the application
of the "enterprise for profit" test. The court applied this test not to
the actual characteristics of the association, but to the state's statutory
classification of it. The character of a corporation, according to the
court, had to be determined from the organization's articles of incorporation and the statutes authorizing its formation. 27 In accordance
with this state classification theory, the court examined the Indiana
Marketing Act 28 under which the cooperative was organized. On the
basis of the nonprofit provisions29 of the Act, the cooperative was
held not to be a "moneyed, business, or commercial corporation" and
thus was not amenable to involuntary bankruptcy. 30
17 Id. Similarly, CAL. AGRIC. CODE § 54033 provides: "Associations which
are organized pursuant to this chapter are 'nonprofit,' since they are not organized to make profit for themselves, as such, or for their members, as such,
but only for their members as producers."

18 8 F.2d at 628.

19 Cases cited notes 23-25 infra.
Ch. 176, § 37, 14 Stat. 517.
Ch. 541, § 4, 30 Stat. 544.
Act of June 25, 1910, ch. 412, § 4, 36 Stat. 838.
23 In re R.L. Radke Co., 193 F. 735 (N.D. Cal. 1911); Alabama & C.R.R.
v. Jones, 1 F. Cas. 275 (No. 126) (C.C.S.D. Ala. 1871); Rankin v. Florida A.
& G.C.R.R., 20 F. Cas. 274 (No. 11,567) (N.D. Fla. 1868).
24 Winter v. Iowa
L & N.P. Ry., 30 F. Cas. 329 (No. 17,890) (C.C.D.
Iowa 1873).
25 Id.; Alabama & C.R.R. v. Jones, 1 F. Cas. 275 (No. 126) (C.C.S.D. Ala.
1871); Sweatt v. Boston H. & E.R.R., 23 F. Cas. 530 (No. 13,684) (C.C.D.
Mass. 1871).
26 In re Dairy Marketing Ass'n, 8 F.2d 626 (D. Ind. 1925).
27 8 F.2d at 628.
28 Ch. 20, [1925] Ind. Acts 42-58.
29 Ch. 20, § 2, [1925] Ind. Acts 42-58.
20
21
22

30 8 F.2d at 628.
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A New Standard
Although to date In re Dairy Marketing Association has not been
expressly overruled, its present validity is open to serious question.
It has been followed only in the case of In re Weeks Poultry Community, Inc.3 1 Subsequent to this decision four other cases 32 (in four
different circuits) have passed on the same question and all of
them have held marketing cooperatives accountable to involuntary
bankruptcy. Three 33 of these four decisions have looked beyond
profit in determining whether or not cooperative marketing associations are "moneyed, business, or commercial." The pivotal case in
this change
was Schuster v. Ohio Farmers' Cooperative Milk Associa4
tion.3
In Schuster the court specifically pointed to the fact that the
Bankruptcy Act does not refer to corporations for profit.3 5 Instead
of profit, the court set forth the following standard:
[W]here the chief purpose of the corporation is to carry on trade or
commerce in an established field, and to do this primarily for the
financial benefit of those who have joined in its organization and the
conduct of its affairs, there is but little room for doubt that the corporation is a "business
or commercial" one within the intendment of
the Bankruptcy Act.3 6
The theory of the court was that cooperatives should not be exempt from involuntary proceedings merely because there is a "difference of economic principle governing the distribution of wealth" from
that of ordinary corporations.3 7 To implement this reasoning, the
court looked beyond the cooperative entity and focused its attention
on the members thereof. Unlike eleemosynary corporations which
are generally formed for philanthropic, humanitarian, or charitable
reasons, 38 cooperatives are formed by farmers, because of the anticipated financial benefit they will derive from the organization in
the marketing of their farm products.3 9 Although the cooperatives
themselves function essentially on a cost basis, 40 the court recognized
that they nevertheless serve as vehicles for the financial advantage of
31
32

51 F.2d 122 (S.D. Cal. 1931).

Cases cited note 3 supra.
33 First Wisconsin Nat'l Bank v. Wisconsin Co-operative Milk Pool, 119
F.2d 999 (7th Cir. 1941); Schuster v. Ohio Farmers' Co-operative Milk Ass'n,
61 F.2d 337 (6th Cir. 1932); In re South Shore Co-operative Ass'n, 4 F. Supp.
772 (W.D.N.Y. 1933).
34 61 F.2d 337 (6th Cir. 1932), noted in 46 HARV. L. REv. 326 (1933), 31
MIcH. L. REv. 982 (1933), and 7 TU.. L. REv. 458 (1933).
35 Id. at 338.
36 Id.
37

Id.

38 In re Michigan Sanitarium & Benevolent Ass'n, 20 F. Supp. 979, 982
(E.D. Mich. 1937).
39 L. HULBERT, supra note 14, at 1.
40 "The principle of doing business on a 'cost basis' involves these concepts: (1) that the contract between a properly organized cooperative and
its patrons vests the excess between its receipts and expenditures during an
accounting period in its patrons, and (2) that, accordingly, a cooperative, as
a legal entity, cannot have entrepreneur profit as respects any excess which
is covered by such contract." Id.
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their members. 41 As such, they are distinguishable from charitable
corporations.
The court's criterion for "moneyed, business, or commercial corcorporation [s]" did not rest solely on this element of financial benefit,
however. The court elaborated:
[I]t is quite conceivable that a co-operative association might be
organized to function without itself engaging in the conduct of any
business. In such
42 event it would doubtless not be amenable to the
Bankruptcy Act.

The additional element the court deemed essential was the organization's external purpose. If that purpose was to carry on trade or
commerce in an established field, then it was a "moneyed, business
or commercial corporation." In essence then, the court's standard
consisted of two elements. First, a financial benefit had to pass to
the organization's members; and second, the organization had to carry
on trade or commerce in an established field.
Since the Schuster case there have been two cases 43 involving
cooperatives that have relied upon the Schuster criterion. Being
engaged in an enterprise for profit was explicitly dismissed as a test
for determining corporate character by the first 44 of these cases.
If a "business" corporation . . .means a corporation organized for
profit, the alleged bankrupt is not subject to the bankruptcy law.
But the4 Bankruptcy Act says nothing about "profits" in this connection. 5
Clearly, the court said, the association was a "business corporation in
the sense that the word 'business' is ordinarily construed." 46 It then
quoted with approval the test set forth in the Schuster case and held
47
the marketing cooperative accountable to involuntary bankruptcy.
The second case to follow Schuster was First Wisconsin National
Bank v. Wisconsin Co-operative Milk Pool. 48 The case is of particular significance since it is the appellate court for the circuit in which
In re Dairy Marketing Association was decided. On that basis the
decision can be interpreted as implicitly overruling the latter case.
It said:
There is nothing in the nature of a co-operative association which
conducts business for the purpose of realizing profit for those with
whom it does business to remove it from the Congressional definition.
While such associations are to be encouraged as instrumentalities
looking to aid of their patrons, they are not eleemosynary or charitable organizations. Rather they represent merely a banding
to49
gether of producers for their common financial advancement.
41 61 F.2d at 338.
42

Id.

43 First Wisconsin Nat'l Bank v. Wisconsin Co-operative Milk Pool, 119

F.2d 999 (7th Cir. 1941); In re South Shore Co-operative Ass'n, 4 F. Supp.
772 (W.D.N.Y. 1933).
44 In re South Shore

45 Id.at 773.
46 Id.
47 Id.

Co-operative Ass'n, 4 F. Supp. 772 (W.D.N.Y. 1933).

48 119 F.2d 999 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 655, noted in 5 U. DET.
L.J. 33 (1941), rev'g 35 F. Supp. 787 (E.D. Wis. 1940), noted in 39 MIcH. L.

R v. 1011 (1941).

49 Id. at 1001-02 (emphasis added).
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The court continued by advancing the Schuster criterion. 50 After the
cooperative was adjudged subject to involuntary bankruptcy, certiorari was denied by the United States Supreme Court.51
In summary, these three cases have talked in terms of "financial benefit to the corporation's members" to distinguish the cooperatives from charitable organizations and to classify them with ordinary
business corporations for purposes of the Bankruptcy Act. The courts
in these cases have recognized that agricultural associations are essentially business entities, notwithstanding the fact that they function on a nonprofit basis. As in the case of other businesses, they
operate in the open market by competitively processing and selling
commodities. Moreover, they are organized for the same reasons as
enterprises, namely, for the financial advantage
are other business
52
of their members.
Furthermore, as stated by the Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit in the case of First Wisconsin National Bank v. Wisconsin
Co-operative Milk Pool:
To hold a corporation amenable to bankruptcy is not in any wise to
interfere with its activities as a useful association or to penalize it.
The Bankruptcy Act is remedial legislation. Its excuse for existence
lies in the underlying theory that in the absence of bankruptcy the
diligent creditor may lay hold of all assets to the detriment of others.
For the old legal maxim that, to the diligent
53 belongs the reward, it
has supplied a new one,-equality is equity.

Anomaly
Missco Homestead Association v. United States,54 the latest case
to hold a cooperative accountable to involuntary bankruptcy proceedings, is dissimilar to the preceding cases. In this instance the
cooperative was organized with the guidance and support of the Department of Agriculture under the laws of Arkansas providing
for the formation of benevolent associations. Its purpose was to
rehabilitate and render self-supporting the families of its members
who were tenant farmers and sharecroppers having low income.
The court deemed this cooperative a "moneyed, business, or commercial corporation." Under the existing cases there were two means
by which the court might have arrived at this result. The court, by
applying the Schuster criterion, might have found that since the cooperative conferred a benefit on its members and was carrying on trade
in an established field, it was a "moneyed, business, or commercial
corporation." Or the court might have applied the "enterprise for
profit" test of In re Dairy Marketing Association to the state's statutory classification. As Arkansas' benevolent association statutes 5 did
not specifically declare the associations organized thereunder to be
nonprofit, application of this test would have resulted in the cooperative being found an enterprise for profit. Instead of these alterna50 Id. at 1000.
51 Wisconsin Co-operative Milk Pool v. First Wisconsin Nat'1 'Bank, 314
U.S. 655 (1941).
52 L. HULBERT, supra note 14 at 1.
53 119 F.2d at 1002.
54 185 F.2d 280 (8th Cir. 1950), afl'g 86 F. Supp. 511 (E.D. Ark. 1949).
55 PoPE's DIGEST OF ARx. STAT. §§ 2252-61 (1937).
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fives, the court adopted the "enterprise for profit" test 6 and applied
it to the cooperative's activities as well as to its state statutory classificaion.
A few cases hold that in determining whether a corporation is a
member of the accepted class, the classification of the corporation by
the state should be given predominant influence ....
But in the light of the decision 5' of the Supreme Court of the
United States . . .this rule is questionable.

In determining whether a corporation is within the classification
of a moneyed, business, or commercial corporation, it would seem the
better rule to take into consideration the classification of the corpoconferred upon it; and the character
ration by the state; the powers 58
and extent of its main activities.
By this means the court reached the conclusion that the cooperative
was an enterprise for profit. 9 Yet, when the court went beyond the
state statutes to the cooperative's actual character, it would seem that
the court should have held the cooperative to be nonprofit. It does
not appear that the cooperative deviated in any way from the normal
cooperative procedure of distributing its net earnings back to its members each year, in proportion to the value of goods and services purchased by each. 60 As such, it had an actual financial nonprofit character."' The court's determination is a departure from the findings of
all of the cases previously discussed. Neither the courts holding
cooperatives immune to involuntary bankruptcy nor those holding
them amenable thereto directly concluded that cooperatives are enterprises for profit. It is submitted that the right decision was reached
by the wrong reasoning.
Deemphasis of the State Classification Rule
Missco has not been the only decision to deemphasize the state
classification rule. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in
FirstNationalBank v. Wisconsin CooperativeMilk Pool said:
The power to determine whether one may be bankrupt... lies with
Congress, and any state legislation interfering with the same must
give way before that paramount authority ....

Federal legislation

...determines whether an interest or right created by local law is
within the federal law. The latter must prevail6 2no matter what name
is given the interest or right by the local law.
This statement was given in response to a district court's contention
that Congress did not enumerate the types of nonprofit organizations which would be exempt from involuntary bankruptcy because
it was the intention of Congress to permit the states to define what
such nonprofit organizations might be.63 The United States Supreme
Court itself weakened the state classification rule when, in an unrelated case, it said, "[I]n the interpretation and application of the
56 185 F.2d at 282.
57 Wragg v. Federal Land Bank, 317 U.S. 325 (1943).
58 185 F.2d at 282 (emphasis added).
59 Id.

86 F. Supp. 511, 515 (E.D. Ark. 1949).
Text accompanying notes 12-15 supra.
62 First Wisconsin Nat'l Bank v. Wisconsin Co-operative Milk Pool, 119
F.2d 999, 1002 (7th Cir. 1941).
63 In re Wisconsin Co-operative Milk Pool, 35 F. Supp. 787, 789 (E.D.
Wis. 1940).
60

61
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Bankruptcy Act as in the case of other federal statutes, federal not
local law applies. ' 64 The Court went on to say that it is for the
bankruptcy court to determine, by reference to the bankruptcy statutes, what rights created by state law are within the jurisdiction of
the bankruptcy court.65 In essence, the trend seems to indicate that
the bankruptcy courts do not have to constrain their judgments to
conform with the state legislative classifications of corporations.
It should be noted, however, that the state classification rule
might still be useful in finding that marketing cooperatives are
amenable to involuntary bankruptcy. By applying the Schuster
standard 6 instead of the "enterprise for profit" test to state marketing
statutes declaring cooperatives to be nonprofit, the cooperatives can
be held amenable to involuntary bankruptcy. In short, that portion
of the statute which declares that these associations are organized to
"make a profit . .. for their members as producers" 67 harmonizes
with the "financial benefit to its members" element of the Schuster

standard. From this it can be deduced that the associations are
"moneyed, business, or commercial corporation [s]" and as such, are
amenable to involuntary bankruptcy.
Congressional Intent
It seems reasonably clear that including cooperatives within the
provisions of involuntary bankruptcy is not contrary to the intent
of Congress. Where Congress has wanted to exempt or include these
instrumentalities from various statutes it has done so expressly. For
example, it exempted them from stamp taxes in the War Revenue
Act of 1898,68 from certain corporate taxes in the Corporation Tax
Statute of 1909,69 and from income taxes in the Income Tax Statute
of 1913. 7 0 By a 1921 amendment 7 ' to the War Finance Corporation
Act of 1918,72 cooperative associations were allowed to receive advances from the Corporation for certain agricultural purposes, and by
a 1923 amendment 73 to the Federal Reserve Act, 74 specific provisions
were made for discounting negotiable instruments of cooperative marketing associations. Under the Agricultural Marketing Act of 1929, 75
cooperatives were able to borrow money from a board created by
the Act. These examples are not intended to be inclusive but are
meant to illustrate positive action on the part of Congress when it
has desired to give cooperatives a special status.
Furthermore, in 1938, when Congress revised the Bankruptcy
Act,76 including subsection 4(b),7 7 it did not specifically exempt co64 Wragg v. Federal Land Bank, 317 U.S. 325, 328 (1943).
65 Id.

Text accompanying notes 42-43 supra.
Note 17 supra and accompanying text.
Ch. 448, § 25, 30 Stat. 461.
69 Ch. 6, § 38, 36 Stat. 112.
70 Ch. 16, § G(a), 38 Stat. 172.
71 Act of Aug. 24, 1921, ch. 80, § 3, 42 Stat. 181, 182.
72 Ch. 45, 40 Stat. 506.
73 Act of March 4, 1923, ch. 252, § 404, 42 Stat. 1479.
74 Ch. 6, 38 Stat. 251 (1913).
66
67
68

75

Ch. 24, 46 Stat. 11.

76

Ch. 575, 52 Stat. 840.

77

11 U.S.C.

§ 22(b) (1964).
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operatives from involuntary bankruptcy although the cases of In re
South Shore Cooperative Association and Schuster v. Ohio Farmers'
Cooperative Milk Association had previously held these associations
liable to involuntary bankruptcy. It must be presumed that Congress approved of this judicial construction, particularly since the
court in the Schuster case specifically commented 7s that congressional
failure to exclude cooperatives from the Act was indicative of congressional intent to make them amenable to the Act.

Conclusion
From the foregoing it is apparent that, by the weight of authority, cooperative marketing associations are amenable to involuntary
proceedings in bankruptcy. Whereas two district courts 79 have exempted these cooperatives from the proceedings, one district court °
and three appellate courts 8 have held them subject thereto. Moreover, one of the district court decisions 82 exempting cooperatives was
implicitly overruled by its circuit court.83 All the decisions holding
cooperatives subject to the involuntary provisions of the Bankruptcy
Act were decided later in point of time.
It is submitted that there is no convincing reason why marketing
cooperatives should be immune to involuntary bankruptcy. First,
the organizations are by no means in an inferior economic position to
other marketing instrumentalities. Presently, about one-quarter of all
United States farm products are handled by these cooperatives at one
8 4
or more stages in their progress from farm to consumer table.
Second, as in the case of other business instrumentalities, these associations operate primarily for the financial benefit of their own
members, rather than for philanthropic or charitable purposes.
In summary, a marketing association is just another means of
doing business, and as such, should be subject to its creditors equitably if it fails.
Kenneth F. Johnson*
78 61 F.2d at 338.
79 In re Weeks Poultry Community, Inc., 51 F.2d 122 (S.D. Cal. 1931);
In re Dairy Marketing Ass'n, 8 F.2d 626 (D. Ind. 1925).
80 In re South Shore Co-operative Ass'n, 4 F. Supp. 772 (W.D.N.Y. 1933).
81 Missco Homestead Ass'n v. United States, 185 F.2d 280 (8th Cir. 1950);
First Wisconsin Nat'l Bank v. Wisconsin Co-operative Milk Pool, 119 F.2d
999 (7th Cir. 1941); Schuster v. Ohio Farmers' Co-operative Milk Ass'n, 61
F.2d 337 (6th Cir. 1932).
82 In re Dairy Marketing Ass'n, 8 F.2d 626 (D. Ind. 1925).
83 First Wisconsin Nat'l Bank v. Wisconsin Co-operative Milk Pool, 119
F.2d 999 (7th Cir. 1941); see text accompanying notes 48-49 supra.
IARKETING, VITAL LuNm
84 R. FREEMAN & E. VAN HORN, AGRIcULTURAL
BETWEEN FARMER AND CONSUMER 15 (U.S. Dep't of Agriculture Marketing Bull.

36, rev. 1966).
* Member, Second Year Class.

